Ramaphosa’s High-Stakes U.S. Visit: Risks, Tensions, and Strategic Calculations

Introduction

President Cyril Ramaphosa’s upcoming visit to Washington (May 19–22, 2025) comes at a fraught moment for U.S.–South Africa relations. He faces a combative President Donald Trump and a climate of unprecedented tension over trade, diplomacy, and geopolitics.

Image: The Go-To Guy Creations

South Africa risks losing vital U.S. trade benefits under AGOA amid talk of targeted sanctions, even as Washington fumes over Pretoria’s foreign policy choices – from taking Israel to the World Court to warming ties with Iran and inflammatory rhetoric at home.

This article examines the diplomatic risks for South Africa, the tone Trump may set (as foreshadowed by his confrontational handling of Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky), and what Ramaphosa hopes to achieve.

It also reviews U.S. political sentiment – including controversies like South Africa’s Gaza genocide case, the “Kill the Boer” saga, an expelled ambassador, and Trump’s offer of refuge to white South Africans – to assess whether Ramaphosa has any realistic chance of influencing Trump’s stance or salvaging the partnership.

Diplomatic Risks for South Africa Under Trump

Ramaphosa’s trip unfolds under the shadow of serious diplomatic and economic risks for South Africa. Chief among these is the potential loss of benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a U.S. preferential trade program.

AGOA has been a linchpin of South African exports, enabling duty-free access for about $4 billion of South African goods (out of $20 billion in total exports to the U.S.). Industries like automobiles, citrus, wine, and textiles have flourished under AGOA, collectively sending nearly $2 billion in exports annually to the U.S..

If South Africa were to be suspended or removed from AGOA – a scenario now openly floated by some in Washington – it would deal a heavy blow to these sectors. The mere uncertainty around AGOA’s renewal under Trump’s “America First” trade policy is already chilling investment and confidence. As one business representative noted, the uncertainty “discourages investment, disrupts supply chains, and forces businesses to consider alternative markets”.

Beyond trade access, looming U.S. sanctions are a pressing concern. In Congress, Republican lawmakers have introduced the U.S.–South Africa Bilateral Relations Review Act of 2025, which mandates identifying South African officials who support America’s adversaries (like China, Russia, and Iran) for possible sanctions. Congressman Ronny Jackson, the bill’s sponsor, accused South Africa of “brazenly abandon[ing] its relationship” with the U.S. to align with rivals – “a betrayal that demands serious consequences,” he said.

A Relationship on the Line

The legislation would empower President Trump to impose sanctions on “corrupt or uncooperative” South African officials. Although framed as targeting individuals, the broader message is clear: Pretoria’s recent foreign policy choices have put the entire bilateral relationship on the line.

Trump’s administration is already using punitive measures. In February, Trump signed an executive order cutting aid to South Africa in response to two issues:

• (1) Pretoria’s new land expropriation law (which Washington portrays as an attack on property rights) and

• (2) South Africa’s legal case against Israel at the International Court of Justice. The aid freeze has hit development programs – from health initiatives like PEPFAR (which supports 17% of South Africa’s HIV/AIDS response) to educational and business partnerships. South African financial markets reacted swiftly; the Rand slumped nearly 1%, and government bond yields spiked amid investor skittishness.

Analysts warn that if U.S. pressure escalates to the financial realm (e.g. restricting South Africa’s access to dollar financing or SWIFT), the fallout could be severe: “If Trump escalates this beyond AGOA… to the financial system level – South Africa could be in serious trouble… yields will skyrocket, the Rand will plummet and inflation will spiral,” one economist cautioned. In short, the stakes for South Africa’s economy are enormous.

President Ramaphosa heads to Washington hoping to halt a downward spiral: to prevent the collapse of trade ties, avert sanctions, and reassure investors that relations can be stabilised.

Trump’s Combative Diplomacy – A Hostile Model?

Any hopes for a gentle diplomatic touch from Washington must reckon with Donald Trump’s confrontational style. Ramaphosa will be dealing with a U.S. president who has shown little hesitation in publicly pressuring and even humiliating foreign counterparts to get his way.

A vivid recent example is Trump’s February 28 Oval Office meeting with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky, which devolved into an extraordinary shouting match before the press.

What began as polite pleasantries abruptly turned into Trump and Vice-President J.D. Vance berating Zelensky for insufficient gratitude and demanding he capitulate. “You’ve done enough talking. You’re not winning this… You gotta be thankful. You don’t have the cards,” Trump snapped at Zelensky during the televised encounter. Vice-President Vance piled on, scolding Zelensky as “disrespectful” for trying to make his case, and noting he hadn’t said “thank you” even once.

Stunned journalists looked on as Trump effectively told the war-time leader to “come back when he is ready for peace,” canceling their planned press conference and deal-signing on the spot.

This incident – virtually unimaginable in previous U.S. administrations – illustrates the combative, transactional model of Trumpian diplomacy. Rather than behind-closed-doors tough talk, Trump is willing to publicly browbeat a counterpart if it serves his aims or plays well with his base.

The Oval Office clash also highlights Trump’s penchant for linking personal “loyalty” or flattery to policy outcomes: Zelensky was chastised for not sufficiently praising Trump’s “leadership”. Analysts worry that Ramaphosa could face similar treatment. Trump may well expect the South African leader to show deference, offer praise, or make concessions as the price of easing U.S. pressure.

Any perceived defensiveness or disagreement from Ramaphosa could risk provoking Trump’s ire in the moment. This dynamic is especially perilous given that Trump’s diplomatic style is often combustible and unpredictable – he might oscillate from cordial to confrontational based on the tone of the meeting or even tweets he sees that morning.

Ramaphosa’s team will be keenly aware of how Trump’s volatile persona, combined with the substantive disputes on the table, could create a hostile atmosphere that tests the South African president’s resolve and diplomatic finesse.

U.S. Political Backlash: Controversies Fuelling Washington’s Hard Line

The Trump administration’s tough stance toward South Africa did not emerge in a vacuum – it reflects bipartisan anger and controversy in Washington over several actions by the Ramaphosa government and its allies. In the past year, a series of incidents severely strained U.S.–South Africa relations, casting Pretoria as out of step with U.S. priorities (and, in U.S. eyes, even hostile). Understanding these flashpoints is crucial to appreciating the headwinds Ramaphosa faces in trying to mend ties. Key among them are:

• Gaza Genocide Case at the ICJ: South Africa outraged the U.S. (and Israel) by spearheading a case at the International Court of Justice accusing Israel of genocide in Gaza. In late 2023, Pretoria filed an 84-page application asking the ICJ to hold Israel accountable for mass killings and “find Israel guilty of suspected genocide,” even urging emergency measures to halt Israel’s military operations. This bold pro-Palestinian move crossed a red line for Washington. Trump cited “Pretoria taking Israel to the International Court of Justice” as a prime reason for cutting U.S. aid. To American lawmakers, it smacks of South Africa aligning with anti-Israel forces at the U.N. and undermining a close U.S. ally. (Pretoria counters that it is upholding international law and human rights in Gaza, consistent with its principled foreign policy.) Nonetheless, this ICJ case fed a narrative in D.C. that South Africa was provoking the West in favor of adversaries – a narrative Trump has seized upon.

• Closer Ties with Iran and Anti-Western Movements: The ruling African National Congress (ANC) has, in U.S. view, cozied up to pariah states and groups. In late 2024 and early 2025, South Africa’s government welcomed high-level visits from Hamas and maintained warm links with Iran – even hinting it might turn to Russia or Iran for help in developing nuclear energy. The ANC hosted Iran’s ambassador at its headquarters and nearly renamed a Johannesburg street after Leila Khaled (a PFLP figure), before that plan was dropped. Such gestures reinforced U.S. perceptions that Pretoria is “aligning with… state sponsors of terror”. Trump explicitly accused South Africa of “strengthening ties with Iran, which supports terrorism globally”, linking this to why relations are at “an all-time low.” Washington think-tanks have flagged terror finance flows through South Africa – alleging that Iranian-linked networks use the country as a hub to fund groups like Hamas and Hezbollah – and suggest South African officials turning a blind eye could face sanctions. In sum, South Africa’s outreach to Iran and refusal to join U.S. pressure on Tehran has further alienated Washington.

• “Kill the Boer” Chant and Racial Tensions: A domestic South African controversy – the “Kill the Boer” chant – has spilled into U.S. discourse with alarming effect. The chant (an old anti-apartheid song invoked by Julius Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters) includes the line “Kill the Boer, kill the farmer,” which some interpret as incitement to violence against white Afrikaners. South African courts have ruled the chant is not hate speech in context, but to many abroad it sounds blatantly racist. In April 2025, the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria condemned the chant in an unusual public statement, saying it “incites violence against ethnic minorities” and slamming the EFF for “propagating racial hate.”. Afrikaner advocacy groups like AfriForum actively lobbied U.S. officials about this issue, warning that white farmers face deadly attacks and that extremist rhetoric goes unpunished. The U.S. condemnation gave global weight to those concerns, lending credence to the idea that South Africa’s white minority needs protection. This directly fed into the next flashpoint – Trump’s refugee program – and has put Pretoria on the defensive. (Ramaphosa’s government insists that while isolated farm attacks occur, there is no campaign of racial genocide – noting Afrikaners remain among the most privileged groups in the country. But the optics of officials singing such slogans have badly hurt South Africa’s image in the West.)

• Expulsion of South Africa’s Ambassador: Diplomatic channels themselves have been jolted by personal acrimony. In March 2025, Trump’s State Department took the drastic step of expelling South Africa’s ambassador to Washington, Ebrahim Rasool, declaring him persona non grata. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced on March 15 that Rasool – a prominent ANC veteran – was “no longer welcome in our great country,” branding him a “race-baiting politician” who “hates the US and President Donald Trump”. The trigger for this expulsion was Rasool’s outspoken criticism of Trump. In a webinar, Rasool had charged that Trump (and Elon Musk) were fomenting a new global white supremacist movement – incendiary words that infuriated Washington. Rubio’s unprecedented use of Twitter (X) to publicly fire a foreign envoy underscored the breakdown in trust. Pretoria “noted with regret” the envoy’s expulsion and scrambled to nominate a replacement, but the damage was done. The episode is a stark backdrop to Ramaphosa’s visit: official dialogue has degenerated to the point where even ambassadors are being kicked out amid mutual recriminations. It also highlights Trump’s pugnacious approach – using public humiliation and punitive acts to make his displeasure unmistakable.

• Afrikaner Refugee Resettlement Program: Perhaps the most startling turn of events has been Trump’s decision to welcome Afrikaner farmers as refugees – effectively positioning the U.S. as a protector of South Africa’s white minority. In early February, President Trump issued an executive order accusing South Africa’s “Black-led government” of “racial discrimination” against Afrikaners and announcing a program to offer them relocation to America. This was followed by a fast-track process that paused almost all other refugee admissions (including those from war-torn countries) in order to prioritize white South Africans. By May 2025, the first group of 49 Afrikaners – including entire families – had been flown to the U.S. on a chartered flight arranged by Washington. “This is persecution based on race… the textbook definition of why the refugee program was created,” asserted a White House official, defending the extraordinary focus on Afrikaners. The Trump administration claims South Africa is pursuing “racist, anti-white policies” through aggressive affirmative action and a new land expropriation law targeting white-owned land. (Pretoria vehemently rejects these claims as “completely false,” saying no one is being persecuted and that the Expropriation Act is a lawful tool to address historic land inequities.) Nonetheless, the optics of planeloads of white South Africans being granted refugee status in the U.S. have been deeply embarrassing for Ramaphosa’s government. It lends credence to its critics and has become a propaganda win for Trump’s narrative about “saving” South African whites. Moreover, it signifies a dramatic policy rift: Washington is effectively indicting South Africa’s domestic policies as abusive, to the point of offering asylum to its citizens. This move has further poisoned the atmosphere ahead of Ramaphosa’s talks with Trump.

Each of these controversies feeds a U.S. political narrative that South Africa under the ANC has “turned against” the West – embracing dictators and terrorists, trampling minority rights, and even attacking U.S. interests.

This narrative, fair or not, means Ramaphosa arrives in Washington with bipartisan skepticism toward his government. Even beyond the Trump Administration, many U.S. lawmakers (Democrats and Republicans alike) are openly critical of South Africa’s recent behavior. For example, influential Senators have warned that South Africa’s “non-alignment” looks more like choosing the wrong side, as Pretoria tilts toward Moscow and Beijing in global forums.

In U.S. media, op-eds ask whether South Africa is still a trustworthy partner or has it “brazenly abandoned” its friendship with America. Ramaphosa will need to address this trust deficit. He must convince not just Trump but a broad American audience that South Africa is not an enemy – that it remains committed to shared values and to the bilateral relationship. This is a tall order amid such charged issues.

Ramaphosa’s Objectives: Can He Sway Trump or Avert a Breach?

Despite the challenges, President Ramaphosa is making this visit in hopes of repairing the relationship and safeguarding South Africa’s interests. His objectives for the meeting are pragmatic and urgent:

• Preserve AGOA and Trade Ties: First and foremost, Ramaphosa wants to ensure South Africa remains in AGOA (which is up for renewal) and retains its duty-free access to the U.S. market. Losing AGOA benefits could cost South Africa tens of thousands of jobs and billions in export revenue in automotive manufacturing, agriculture, and textiles. He will likely stress how interconnected the economies are – for instance, how U.S. companies in South Africa (over 600 of them) benefit from the bilateral trade, and how American buyers rely on South African products from oranges to BMWs. By making a “business case” to Trump, who prides himself on deal-making, Ramaphosa may argue that punishing South Africa will hurt U.S. companies and consumers too. (Notably, some U.S. auto giants have lobbied to keep South Africa in AGOA, since they profit from importing SA-assembled vehicles.) Ramaphosa is expected to offer assurances – perhaps promising that South Africa will diversify its trade partners or not give undue advantage to China – to persuade Trump that maintaining trade cooperation is in mutual interest.

• Avert Sanctions and Restore Dialogue: Ramaphosa will aim to defuse the push for targeted sanctions. He is likely prepared to engage on the litany of U.S. complaints and show a willingness to find common ground. For example, on the Iran/Hamas issue, he might quietly pledge to be more cautious in public engagements that appear to endorse U.S.-designated terrorist groups. On the Russia question (South Africa’s neutrality on the Ukraine war), he might highlight his efforts to broker peace (South Africa hosted Ukraine’s Zelensky recently and has engaged Russia too), casting this as a positive role rather than malign neutrality. A key message Ramaphosa brings is that South Africa wants to “reset” relations. After a phone call with Trump in April, Ramaphosa’s office emphasised that both leaders seek to “foster good relations” and there is “a general appetite to normalise the relationship.”. He will likely invite the U.S. to reopen channels for frank dialogue instead of trading public barbs and punitive measures. The replacement of Ambassador Rasool (whose harsh rhetoric inflamed tensions) with a new envoy could be offered as a goodwill gesture. Indeed, Ramaphosa has signaled he’ll “clear the air” and explain South Africa’s positions to avoid misunderstandings. His task is to convince Trump that a stable partnership is still possible and preferable to a rupture.

• Protect Sovereignty and Explain SA’s Stance: While seeking compromise, Ramaphosa also needs to stand his ground on some principles to satisfy his domestic audience. He will attempt to clarify South Africa’s perspective on contentious issues. For instance, on land reform, he can point to the South African constitution and courts, explaining that the Expropriation Act is “not a confiscation instrument, but a constitutionally mandated process” to address historical injustices. “South Africa has not confiscated any land… and has legal safeguards much like the U.S. does,” is a message he’s already telegraphed. By dispelling what Pretoria calls “misinformation,” Ramaphosa hopes to show Trump that some of his fears (or the claims of groups like AfriForum) are overblown. Likewise, on the Israel–Palestine issue, Ramaphosa may reiterate that South Africa’s actions stem from commitments to human rights and international law – not animus toward the U.S. He might seek to assure Trump that South Africa remains a reliable partner on other fronts (for example, noting cooperation in African peacekeeping, or that South Africa values its “strategic partnership” with the U.S. despite differences). Balancing conciliation with asserting South Africa’s sovereignty will be tricky. Ramaphosa cannot afford to be seen at home as kowtowing to Washington or betraying core ANC ideals (like solidarity with Palestine or the principle of non-alignment). His diplomatic finesse will be tested to find language that satisfies Trump’s demands for action while not compromising too much.

The big question is: Can Ramaphosa actually influence Trump’s policies or attitudes? 

Realistically, his leverage is limited. Trump holds most of the cards – South Africa needs U.S. market access and goodwill far more than the U.S. needs South Africa in purely economic terms. Moreover, Trump’s worldview tends to cast issues in stark friend-or-foe terms. Ramaphosa will try to persuade Trump that South Africa can still be a friend.

One opening could be Trump’s own desire for a “deal” or a visible win. If Ramaphosa can offer something Trump can tout as a victory, Trump might be swayed. For example, South Africa could pledge a tougher stance on illicit finance (cracking down on any Hamas or Hezbollah fundraising on its soil), which Trump could frame as a win against terrorism.

Or Ramaphosa might hint at moving South Africa slightly back toward the Western orbit – perhaps not inviting sanctioned Russian vessels or scaling down military exercises with Russia/China – giving Trump a talking point that he pulled South Africa away from the BRICS camp.

Ramaphosa might also invite greater U.S. investment in South African infrastructure or energy, appealing to Trump’s business sense (and perhaps offering American firms opportunities that currently are going to Chinese companies). Such concessions or incentives could potentially soften Trump’s stance.

However, one must be candid: shifting Trump’s attitude may prove very difficult. The U.S. domestic political momentum against South Africa is strong, and Trump is surrounded by advisers who favour a hard line (exemplified by Secretary Rubio and VP Vance).

Trump himself may see advantage in being seen as tough on South Africa – it plays well with his base and certain Congressional hawks. For instance, his refugee program for Afrikaners has been popular on the U.S. right wing, and he may have little political incentive to reverse it.

Ramaphosa’s charm and logic could easily collide with Trump’s transactional mindset. Without a clear gain for Trump, mere appeals to reason or friendship might fall flat. Trump might also demand immediate, visible concessions from Ramaphosa as the price of any relief.

The South African president could find himself in an uncomfortable spot if Trump says, for example: “Drop the ICJ case against Israel, and maybe we’ll talk about keeping you in AGOA.” Committing to something like that would be almost impossible for Ramaphosa politically. Thus, while Ramaphosa can aim to influence at the margins – smoothing communication, correcting misconceptions, offering minor trade-offs – he is unlikely to dramatically change Trump’s core positions in one meeting.

The best outcome he can realistically hope for is to pause or slow the downward spiral: perhaps convince Trump not to kick South Africa out of AGOA immediately, or to hold off on sanctioning officials, buying time for further talks. Even a public statement from Trump afterward that is neutral or mildly positive (“we had a frank discussion and will work together”) would count as a diplomatic success for Ramaphosa under the circumstances.

Conclusion: Weighing the Implications for South Africa

President Ramaphosa’s Washington visit is a high-wire act with far-reaching implications for South Africa’s foreign and economic policy. On one side lies the risk of a full-blown break with the U.S. – a scenario in which trade privileges are lost, sanctions imposed, and South Africa finds itself diplomatically isolated from the West. Such an outcome would not only hurt South Africa’s economy (through export losses, capital flight, and investor jitters) but could also force Pretoria into deeper dependence on alternative partners like China and Russia.

It would mark a definitive shift in the country’s post-apartheid trajectory, away from the Western alignment that has brought investment and goodwill over the past decades. On the other side, there is a chance – albeit slim – that Ramaphosa’s engagement can stabilize the U.S.–South Africa relationship before it fractures further. If he manages to allay enough of Washington’s concerns to keep South Africa in AGOA and ward off punitive measures, it buys critical breathing room.

South Africa would retain preferential access to its second-largest export market (the U.S.), safeguarding thousands of jobs and important industries. It would also mean Pretoria can continue its delicate balancing act of non-alignment without immediate economic calamity, giving Ramaphosa space to pursue his broader agenda (like economic reforms and his African diplomacy initiatives).

In weighing these outcomes, President Ramaphosa must carefully consider what sacrifices he is willing to make.

Concessions to Trump might secure short-term relief but could carry long-term costs. For instance, if South Africa appears to bow to U.S. pressure by toning down its stance on Israel or Iran, this could erode its credibility among other partners in the Global South and within the ANC’s rank-and-file. It might also embolden Washington to demand more in the future.

Conversely, if Ramaphosa stands firm on principle and the U.S. reacts with punitive steps, South Africa must be prepared to weather the storm. That could mean accelerating trade ties with other markets (China, Europe, Africa) to compensate for lost U.S. access, and doubling down on self-reliance in certain sectors. Neither path is cost-free.

The ideal outcome – and presumably Ramaphosa’s goal – is to find a middle ground where South Africa reaffirms its positions in a respectful dialogue yet convinces the U.S. that punishing South Africa will backfire. As he put it recently, “We are certain that out of [engagements], we will share a better and common understanding… The US remains a key strategic partner for South Africa.” 

Achieving that “common understanding” is crucial for restoring a working relationship.

This visit will thus be a defining moment for Ramaphosa’s foreign policy. If he succeeds, he may stabilize one of South Africa’s most important international relationships and protect the economy from a body blow. If he fails, U.S.–South Africa ties could enter a new era of estrangement, with South Africa potentially ejected from AGOA and top officials in Washington openly treating Pretoria as aligned with the enemy.

The strategic stakes are high: South Africa’s role as a bridge between the West and the developing world is in question, as is its reputation for an independent yet responsible foreign policy.

For Ramaphosa – known as a consensus-builder rather than a firebrand – the Trump meeting will test his diplomatic mettle like never before. The world will be watching to see if he can defend South Africa’s interests without capitulating, and whether he can find any rapport with an American president who has so far shown him little but frustration.

In the balance hangs not only the fate of trade deals and sanctions lists, but the broader trajectory of South Africa’s global alignment in an increasingly polarised world. Ramaphosa’s challenge is to navigate this minefield and emerge with a viable path forward – keeping South Africa open for business with all partners, while upholding the values and autonomy it holds dear.

The outcome of his U.S. visit will heavily influence whether South Africa can maintain that delicate balance, or whether it is forced into painful choices that could reshape its foreign and economic policy for years to come.

---

Sources: The article above is informed by reports from BBC News, The Citizen (SA), Politico (AP), BBC Monitoring, Semafor, official statements from South Africa’s Presidency, and other reputable media and policy research outlets, as cited throughout. Key citations include BBC reports on the U.S. expulsion of Ambassador Rasool and the Trump–Zelensky Oval Office clash, Politico’s coverage of the Afrikaner refugee airlift, and South African media detailing Trump’s aid cutoff and Congressional sanctions push. These and other sources provide a factual basis for assessing the risks and dynamics surrounding President Ramaphosa’s critical visit to Washington.